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The 1846 Repeal of the Corn Laws: insights from a classification tree 
approach 
Stephen Peplow 
1. Introduction 
In 1815, the British parliament, fearing an inundation of wheat from the Baltic 
states, imposed import duties by amending the Corn Laws, which effectively 
transferred a significant rent to landowners.   Riots against what became known as 
the ‘bread tax’ took place in several cities, but apart from some relatively minor 
relaxations, the laws remained in force until 1846 when Parliament repealed them 
amidst huge controversy. 1  The imposition of a tariff wall by a parliament of 
landowners, surely one of the most blatantly self-interested acts carried out by any 
legislature, took place just when the wars with Napoleon were over, but the struggle 
for a wider franchise had just begun. During the three decades that the Laws were in 
force, the franchise was to some extent widened by the Reform Act of 1832, 
increasing the number of seats allocated to ‘county’ or rural areas, and also providing 
representation for the first time for industrialising areas such as Manchester. 
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Meanwhile, the ideas of economists such as David Ricardo and John Stewart Mill 
were gradually gaining currency.  
  Repeal of the Corn Laws continues to interest for political scientists 
because it does not respond to any of the materialist models. As Iain McLean puts 
it, ‘the median member of each house voted in favour of Repeal, whereas any 
model based on material interest predicts that he would have voted against’. 2  
However, the fact remains that, despite the models, the majority of Conservative 
Members of Parliament (MPs) voted against their own government in favour of 
continued protection, while 114 ‘Peelite’ MPs followed their leader and Prime 
Minister, Sir Robert Peel, in voting for Repeal. The personal costs of Repeal were 
enormous. Robert Peel was forced to resign two weeks later, and the Conservative 
Party which he had done so much to build remained broken and out of power for 
several decades. Peel had been repeatedly made aware that Repeal would not go 
smoothly, yet he pressed forward. Why he did so, and why those particular 114 
MPs chose to follow him has remained a ‘puzzle’, despite numerous attempts to 
provide a quantitative solution.3  Most responses to the challenge of modeling 
Repeal employ demand-side models, in which an MP’s is vote is considered to be a 
direct response to constituency interests. More recently, Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey 
has included supply-side variables in her model. The variables come from content 
analysis of the speeches of MPs. The result is a much more accurate model, 
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allowing her to ‘reinterpret’ Repeal. 4 In this interpretation, the Conservative Party 
is a coalition of interests, made up of MPs from rural constituencies, and MPs from 
more progressive constituencies which are dependent on overseas trade. Until 
approximately one year before Repeal, both parts of the coalition considered 
themselves to be ‘trustees’, with wide national interests as their motivation.  As it 
became clear, in the spring of 1846, that Peel was definitely going to proceed with 
Repeal, Conservative MPs became torn between voting with the interests of their 
constituents and with their leader. Peel rescued them from their dilemma by 
‘characterizing repeal as a means to preserve the traditional institutions of the 
British government --- and, in particular, the aristocracy’. 5 The Peelites then felt 
able to vote as trustees rather than delegates.  
This article contributes to the literature by using different variables, some of 
which have been constructed to proxy for less directly measurable pressures that 
MPs felt. In addition we include religious observance which has been neglected in 
previous studies. The neglect is odd because Peel created a serious split in his own 
party in 1845 when he proposed to increase the government’s annual grant to the 
Irish Catholic Seminary at Maynooth. Nearly half of Peel’s own Conservative MPs 
voted against their government’s motion over Maynooth, and the measure passed 
only because the Opposition sided with the government. Many of these same 
rebellious MPs also voted against Repeal one year later. An entirely new approach 
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is to use a classification tree for the statistical analysis. 6 This is a recursive 
partitioning algorithm which performs an exhaustive search over all possible splits. 
We have assembled a number of different variables which we test, using voting 
over Repeal as the dependent variable. We find that party affiliation and previous 
voting over Maynooth are the most important predictors, and that Maynooth is 
especially important. Our conclusions therefore support those reached by 
Schonhardt-Bailey, determined by a different statistical process, and highlighting 
the overlooked importance of religion in early Victorian voting decisions. 
The article begins with a discussion of the motivations of Sir Robert Peel for 
proposing two motions which he knew would meet considerable opposition from 
within his own Conservative party.  
 
2. Peel’s motivations 
 
Although Sir Robert Peel led his Conservative Party to victory in 1841 on a 
platform of continued agricultural protection and ‘no popery’, Peel himself did not 
make much use of the two issues, allowing his rural candidates to provide their 
own interpretations. 7 The result will be discussed below in Section 4, because the 
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dangerous imbalance in seats held played an important role in the splits within the 
Conservative Party which followed soon after. 
Despite Peel’s own reticence, contemporaries would certainly have believed 
that he himself held these views and would therefore maintain them when in office. 
8 However, Peel’s actions as Prime Minister showed this belief to be misplaced. 
Instead, as his most recent biographer has noted, Peel’s primary concerns were the 
improvement of the domestic economy and a reduction of the tensions in Ireland.9 
Peel took action on his concerns over Ireland through Maynooth and over the 
economy through the Repeal of the Corn Laws. In this section, we describe Peel’s 
reasons for concentrating on these particular issues and his actions to resolve them. 
In doing so, we note the reasons why some members of his own party found these 
policies so intolerable that they drove their party almost to destruction.  
 
 
2.1 Ireland: Peel and Maynooth 
 
 Peel was familiar with the poverty and increasing unrest of Ireland from his 
time as Irish Secretary at the beginning of his political career, and took the view 
that improving the Irish education system would help to reduce the unrest. He 
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proposed the establishment of non-denominational colleges. Here he ran into heavy 
opposition from Anglicans and, less predictably, from the Vatican.10  The colleges 
were never built.  
 He had more success, but at the cost of even more controversy, when 
in 1845 he proposed to convert the government’s annual grant to the Irish Catholic 
Seminary at Maynooth into an endowment and also to increase the size of the 
grant.  Peel’s rationale was that the wretched conditions at Maynooth were 
inculcating priests with a hatred of Britain which would then spread throughout 
Ireland. At this time, anti-Catholic feeling was especially strong, as Paul Adelman 
writes, ‘By the 1840s, mainly as a result of increased antipathy to the Irish and 
fears engendered by the Oxford Movement, the country was probably more anti-
Catholic than it had been a year earlier.’11  Predictably, rural backbenchers and the 
newspapers reacted to Peel’s Maynooth proposal with outrage, especially as Peel 
had been one of the prime movers behind the Catholic Emancipation Bill of 1829.  
Edward Miall, editor of the Nonconformist, wrote that the Maynooth Bill was a 
‘measure which can only be taken as a preliminary to the payment by the state of 
the Roman Catholic priesthood’. Ten thousand petitions against Maynooth raised a 
million and a quarter signatures.  Harriet Martineau described the Maynooth 
Question as the ‘great political controversy of the year, the subject of which 
society seemed to be going mad.’ In an impassioned speech at Exeter Hall, the MP 
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John Plumptre told his audience that ‘To endow Popery once more in a land that 
has been rescued from its yoke, is a madness little short of high treason against 
heaven.’ 12 
  Peel’s Cabinet colleagues were aware of the high political risks of 
Maynooth.  Sir James Graham, Peel’s closest colleague, pointed out to him, ‘I 
foresee that on the part of the British public, invincible repugnance will be felt to 
any such proposal’.13 Graham was right.  Of all Conservatives, 147 voted against 
the Government in the Second Reading, and 159 for the motion. The voting was 
even closer at the Third Reading, with the Conservatives being almost exactly 
divided. The motion was carried only because substantial numbers of the Whig-
Liberal Opposition voted for the motion, a precursor for the Corn Laws division 
almost exactly a year later. As a result of Maynooth, Peel had alienated 
approximately half of the parliamentary Conservative Party for no real gain. There 
is no evidence that Irish Catholic priests were grateful for the grant. Peel’s next 
move, against the Corn Laws, was even more destructive. 
 
2.2 The economy and the Corn Laws 
 
The departing Whig government had left Peel with a budget deficit of over 
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£2 million for the current year and no obvious means of recovery from the 
recession which had begun in 1838.14  Peel began to believe that a gradual 
replacement of import duties by taxation would provide both an alternative and 
more reliable source of revenue for the government; and an improvement in the 
economy from gains from trade.  The result was the ambitious budget of 1842, 
which reduced the import tariffs on 750 articles, including livestock.15 In the same 
year he lowered the import duty on wheat. The income tax, which had been first 
imposed during the French Wars but removed shortly afterwards, came back at 
seven pennies in the pound, or about three per cent. The budget was slow to take 
effect because of the recession and bureaucratic delays: it took six months for the 
income tax machinery to be set up. 16  By early 1844, the economy has recovered 
to the extent that government was able to renew ₤250 million in bonds at a lower 
rate of interest. Professor Gash has noted that Peel’s budgets did more for the poor 
than all of the reforms under Shaftesbury combined. 17 Peel now had first-hand 
evidence that transferring the burden of financing the government from import 
duties to the more progressive income tax did indeed produce gains from trade.  
The largest obstacle to further free trade, the Corn Laws, were still in place. 
Here Peel faced two difficulties. The first was that his own party considered itself 
to be a party of the land. In 1841, Lord Ashburton remarked that, ‘I am aware to 
what extent our Conservative party is a party pledged to the support of the land and 
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that, that principle abandoned, the party is dissolved’. 18 At the same time, the 
growing of wheat and adherence to the Church of England were spatially 
correlated, as we show below in Section 5. Having alienated his more anti-Catholic 
supporters with Maynooth, Peel was now asking them to give up agricultural 
protection, a belief almost equally cherished and which, as Edwin Jaggard notes, 
had won the 1841 General Election for the Conservatives. 19  
The second difficulty came from the opposite direction. The Anti-Corn Law 
League (ACCL) had formed itself into an extremely well-organised and highly 
successful pressure group. 20 The League, formed by Richard Cobden and John 
Bright, was financed in the main by Lancashire textile manufacturers, who were 
able to see that their own exports of finished goods would increase if their buyers 
were able to earn money by selling wheat. Meanwhile, the ACCL ramped up the 
pressure on MPs, especially in the larger industrializing boroughs which were their 
strongholds.21  
An interesting and astute strategy used by the ACCL was to attack the 
Church of England. 22 Dissent was concentrated in cities and industrial areas, 
typically in the north-west of the country, and by organizing conferences and 
meetings for dissenting ministers, the league drew attention to the abuses and 
weaknesses of the established church. One especial vulnerability was the link 
between the church and the collection of tithes. Most tithes were owned by the 
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Church, and collected by the local vicar with varying degrees of aggressiveness.23 
The 1836 Tithe Commutation Commission had commuted the physical harvest to a 
‘corn rent’ based on the average price of wheat over the previous seven years.24 
Now not only farmers and landowners but also the clergy benefited from high 
wheat prices. By arguing that the Corn Laws caused high wheat prices, the ACCL 
suggested that the clergy supported protectionism to maintain their own tithes.25 
The evidence for the effectiveness of the ACCL’s campaigning is mixed. In an 
interesting and imaginative survey of local newspapers, Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey 
has shown that free-trade interests had become ‘increasingly politicized under the 
leadership of the Anti-Corn Law League’. 26 Liberal MPs were increasingly likely 
to vote in the direction of free trade as a result, but the effect on Conservative MPs 
was negligible.  
The League was also able to make full use of the 1832 Reform Act by 
vigorous action over electoral rolls. The ‘forty-shilling householder’ was entitled to 
vote, but had to be registered so that his name appeared on the electoral roll. The 
League worked extremely hard to ensure that as many of their supporters as 
possible were on the roll, meanwhile challenging the validity of entries relating to 
protectionist voters. As result, the League was able to direct the voting in several 
constituencies so that free-traders were returned.  
The landed interests formed an ‘anti-league’ to combat the ACLL but its 
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leaders lacked the organizing skill and fervor of Cobden and Bright. 27 More 
effective opposition to Repeal emerged in January 1846 when Peel introduced his 
bill to repeal the Corn Laws, provoking protectionist Conservative MPs into action. 
Lord George Bentinck emerged as their reluctant but determined leader, and a 
Protectionist group formed within the Conservative Party. 28  Bentinck, one of the 
more curious characters to emerge in early Victorian politics, was a backbencher 
who had rarely spoken in the House, and who was frequently engaged at his large 
racing stables. He felt intensely betrayed by Peel’s apparently overnight conversion 
to free-trade, and spoke for many Conservative MPs when he complained about 
being ‘sold’ referring to the electoral strategy which Peel had used to win the 
election.29 Under Bentinck, a Protectionist party began to form, with its own 
offices and administration. An important tactic of the new group was to put up 
Protectionist candidates at by-elections. Encouraged by tenant farmers, 
Protectionist candidates won 16 out of the 24 by-elections held between January 
and May 1846. 30  The pressure that MPs suspected of free-trade leanings came 
under was intense. The Northamptonshire Protection Society sent a deputation to 
their MP to urge him to resign if his views on the Corn Laws differed from theirs.31  
Repeal passed at its Third Reading on 15 May 1846 but, as with Maynooth, 
only with support from the Opposition. Of the 241 Conservatives, who voted 
against Repeal, 119 had also voted against Maynooth.  The Protectionist majority 
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of the Conservative Party voted against the Bill, but 114 Conservative ‘Peelite’ 
MPs voted with Peel and for Repeal. The outcome of the vote is presented below 
in Table 1, but it should be noted that tabulations differ, not helped by errors and 
duplications in Hansard. The result below is based on Aydelotte’s dataset, but his 
records do not indicate whether an MP who is not recorded as voting was in fact an 
MP at the date of the division. The database in use has been amended by working 
through other Hansard records to establish a list of MPs who were absent for the 
Repeal vote for any reason.  
 
 
Table 1. Repeal voting in 1846. 
Note: one MP remains unaccounted for. After the disenfranchisement of the 
corrupt borough of Sudbury in 1844, the total number of seats was 656.  
 
 
 Against For  Absent Total 
Conservative 241 114 21 376 
Opposition 10 235 34 279 
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Total 251 349 55 655 
 
 
 Although the government won the vote over Repeal, the fact that less than 
half of the Conservative MPs voted for the Repeal meant that Peel had lost the 
confidence of his own party. Two weeks later, when Repeal had been passed by 
the House of Lords, the government resigned.  
 
 Peel’s choice of timing for Repeal is interesting, and may well be related to 
the next General Election which had to occur in 1848, as Parliaments were then of 
seven years duration. Peel was well aware that his protectionist wing were winning 
by-election seats, and it is possible that he feared that his margin would be reduced 
even more unless he acted quickly. He also perhaps did not want to appear to be 
giving in to the extra-parliamentary pressure exerted by the ACLL. By choosing 
the months over which the debate would be fought, he was at the least maintaining 
some semblance of control.   
 
4.  Election platforms in the 1841 General Election 
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The previous section discussed Robert Peel’s proposals for changes in two 
key issues of the day: agricultural protection and religion. To see why these were 
powerful factors in influencing the voting decisions of MPs’, it is necessary to step 
back from Maynooth and Repeal and examine the 1841 General Election in some 
detail.  Over protection, the platforms of the two parties were in direct opposition. 
Whig candidates in industrial areas indicated that they would reduce the Corn 
Laws to a fixed duty in order to reduce the price of bread, while Conservative 
candidates were in favour of maintaining the present rate of protection. 
Conservative electoral posters in the west riding of Yorkshire read: ‘West Riding 
Manufacturers:  the Pride of England. The altar, the throne and the Cottage. If 
agriculture decays, trade will not flourish’. The Tory-leaning Kentish Gazette 
helpfully claimed that the effect of any Whig budget would be to ‘overthrow the 
existing order of society, to trample down the agriculturalist and the farm 
labourer’. 32 This threat was credible because the Whig leader, Lord John Russell, 
had courted support from the new ‘middling classes’ by proposing a reduction of 
the import duties on wheat to a small fixed duty.   
For Conservatives, the second issue was defence of the Church of England, 
and by implication resistance to both Irish Catholics and English Dissenters. 33  
Peel took advantage of a last-minute Whig proposal to appropriate surplus Church 
of Ireland revenues to suggest that a future Whig government might be unable to 
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safeguard not only church property, but all property, making a further veiled 
reference to agricultural protection, and was also able to point to the large fiscal 
deficit run up by the Whigs by linking the deficit to agricultural protection.  While 
contemporaries were left in no doubt that a future Conservative government under 
Peel would continue the supremacy of the Church of England and, no less 
important, maintain protection for agriculture, this was not necessarily Peel’s own 
view. In a speech at the close of the previous parliament in 1840, he said that if 
elected, he would ‘earnestly advise a relaxation, an alteration, nay if necessary a 
Repeal of the Corn Law.’  
 
4.1 Election results and their implications 
Lord Blake describes the Conservative platform in 1841 as ‘protection, 
Protestantism and no popery’ and this message went over best in the more rural 
constituencies.34 As a result, the Conservatives won many county seats, but rather 
fewer seats in the large boroughs. In the large boroughs the Whig message of lower 
bread prices, and by implication a lower wage bill, earned support from tradesmen 
and employers. Table 1 below cross-tabulates Party with Constituency Type.  
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Conservative domination of the county and small borough seats is clear. Just 
as clear is their vulnerability in the large boroughs where opposition to agricultural 
protection was greatest. 
 
Table 2. Cross-tabulation of seats won in the 1841 election by party and type of 
constituency 
Source; Aydelotte’s dataset 
 
Party County 
Small 
Borough 
Large 
Borough University Total 
Cons 184 109 70 6 369 
Whig 71 90 128 0 289 
Total 255 199 198 6 658 
 
 The vulnerability was especially dangerous because, as we show below, 
support for the Church of England was strongest in the wheat-growing regions.  In 
rural areas, any attempt to weaken either the position of the Anglican Church or 
reduce agricultural protection implied an attempt to weaken the other. 35  The 
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narrow grounds on which rural seats had been won was especially problematic for 
those Conservative MPs who had gone so far as to pledge that they would resist 
any weakening of agricultural protection. Such MPs were especially vulnerable 
when Peel began to cut away at the pillars of protection and Protestantism through 
which they had won their seats.   
 
5. Data and Methods 
 
The goal of this article is to estimate the relative strengths of the factors which 
influenced the decision of an MP to vote either for or against repeal of the Corn 
Laws, and to illustrate the importance of Maynooth in influencing his decision.  
This section introduces the dataset used in the quantitative analysis, the 
methodology and the results. The dataset is primarily that compiled by Professor 
W.O. Aydelotte in the 1960s. He collected data on nearly two hundred divisions in 
the 1841 Parliament, choosing those which were well-attended. It is fortunate for 
subsequent scholars that he did so much painstaking work on the Parliament during 
which Repeal occurred. 36 Iain McLean has added data from the 1851 Census, 
primarily on religious observance, and we use this below. We have constructed and 
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added new variables obtained mostly with the aid of Geographical Information 
Systems (GIS). These are described below. 
Wheat-dependency. 
Robert Peel’s proposal to remove import duties on wheat would have the greatest 
impact on two groups: those who grew wheat, and those who bought bread. The 
producers of wheat might be expected to protest Repeal, while buyers would 
welcome Repeal. To capture the dependency of each political constituency on 
wheat growing, we have created two measures of dependency on wheat-farming.  
The first is a straightforward share of area under wheat and area under cattle at the 
county level, using data from the 1869 Census of Agriculture. From this data, we 
used geographical information systems (GIS) to develop a surface which we then 
integrated into the dataset, to provide a share at the political constituency level. 
The second variable, the ‘wheat balance’, is more complex but has the 
benefit of working ‘in both directions’.  By this we mean that the measure takes 
into account both the desire to profit from the export of wheat to other counties, 
and the desire to have cheaper bread, a feature lacking in the wheat share measure 
described above.  The Corn Laws meant that very little wheat was imported into 
Britain, apart from Irish supplies 37  and so wheat production and consumption was 
a closed system. The county-level value for wheat dependency is the net surplus or 
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deficit for each county, calculated by multiplying each county’s wheat acreage by 
reported yield, and then subtracting consumption, found by multiplying  the 
population by per capita consumption. The balance indicates either a surplus 
available for export, or a shortfall requiring an import. Full details of the 
calculations and the datasets are available from the author on request.  Areas which 
produced more wheat than they consumed would therefore wish to earn money by 
‘exporting’ their surplus to less productive areas. We have calculated the net 
balance for each constituency, which we call the ‘wheat-balance’, Constituencies 
with a positive balance would, we suggest, resist Repeal because much of their 
livelihood depended on the continued selling of wheat. For constituencies with a 
negative balance, such as the larger industrializing boroughs, the desire for cheap 
bread would encourage voting for Repeal.  The data used to construct the wheat-
balance variable comes from the 1869 Census of Agriculture, the first such census 
to be held. 38 (Thirsk and Collins 1967).  Although data closer in time to the 1840s 
would clearly have been preferred, it is unlikely that the distribution of wheat-
growing changed markedly between 1846 and 1869. 39   
Party affiliation 
Early-Victorian Parliamentarians were rather more independent of their party whip 
compared to MPs of today, and party loyalty was only gradually developing. Peel 
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himself once stated that he cared nothing for party. Aydelotte has helpfully 
included a coding representing party affiliation which we shall use.  
Local wheat price 
The price of wheat varied considerably, depending on the amount of expensive 
inland transportation required. Wheat was therefore most expensive in the 
industrializing north-west, far from the corn-producing areas of Lincolnshire and 
the south-east. The wheat price in 1845 was found from prices reported in the 
London Gazette as holding at approximately 150 registered markets throughout 
Britain.  Again, we use kriging to interpolate between the points. The result is as 
one would expect. Wheat is cheapest in the arable areas of Lincolnshire and 
Cambridgeshire in the east, and most expensive in the north-east of England.  
Capital intensity in agriculture 
Farmers who had invested heavily in their land did so on the basis of continued 
high wheat prices. As a result, such farmers were highly sensitive to any measures 
which might threaten wheat prices. To proxy for capitalisation, we use the ratio of 
farmers to farm labourers, calculated from employment data contained within the 
1841 census. Each county contains approximately five locations at which counts of 
farmers and farm labourers were recorded. Using kriging, we developed a surface 
which interpolates the ratio between farmer and labourer. We use the ratio as a 
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proxy for the capital intensity of agriculture, a higher ratio implying a larger labour 
force and thus more capital. 40  
 Maynooth voting 
Aydelotte supplies the roll-call outcome of voting over Maynooth. This variable 
will be used in the classification tree to test whether an MP’s vote over Maynooth 
contributed to his vote over Repeal. 
Type of constituency 
Political constituencies are grouped into four classes: rural; small boroughs; large 
boroughs; universities (which at that time meant just Oxford and Cambridge). We 
would expect rural constituencies to oppose Repeal, because agriculture might well 
be their only source of revenue. Small boroughs would tend to support 
Protectionism because they depended on agriculture. Large boroughs would 
oppose Repeal because the manufacturers located in larger urban areas tended to 
favour free trade. 
Model 
Combining the variables above provides a model as follows, with the MP’s voting 
decision as the dependent variable.  
Pr (Vote for Repeal = f(wheat balance, party, wheat price, capital intensity, 
Maynooth, Constituency Type).  
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5.2 Principal Component Analysis  
The discussion above in section 4  concerning campaigning in the 1841 General 
Election claimed that areas which grew wheat were also areas in which the 
population were more likely to attend an Anglican Church for worship. It is time to 
test this claim and, more broadly, to develop a profile of the constituency 
characteristics. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a suitable tool for this task. 
41 The goal of PCA is to reduce the dimensionality of the data so that a small 
number of dimensions contain the bulk of the variance in the dataset. 42  Figure 2 
shows the results of the PCA on variables which relate to the constituencies only, 
and not to the MP who represented that constituency. The results are helpful in 
understanding the background for his decision to vote for or against repeal. 
Figure 1 here  
Caption: Principal components analysis of constituency variables. 
 
 The variables have been standardised so that differences in units and scales 
do not distort the analysis. As a result, it is possible to quantify the contribution 
that each variable makes to any one of the dimensions and each variable’s 
correlation with a dimension. In general, PCA reduces the variability within the 
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dataset to less than five dimensions. In Figure 1, the first dimension accounts for 
44.15 per cent of the variability, and the second dimension 17.99 per cent. 
Therefore over 60 per cent of the total variability is accounted for by the first two 
dimensions.  Here dimension 1 appears to include variables relating to arable 
farming and attendance at an Anglican church. On the other hand, dimension 2, 
which is orthogonal to dimension 1, contains information relating to livestock 
farming and worship at a Catholic church on Census Day 1851. The direction of 
the arrows for each variable indicates that variable’s correlation with the first 
dimension. For the first dimension, wheat acreage is close to parallel with 
attendance at an Anglican church, and also, the wheat balance. Numbers of sheep 
is also contained within this dimension because arable farmers folded sheep onto 
their fields when the field was between crops or fallow. Numbers of cattle is 
diametrically opposed because cattle farming was generally carried out on the hilly 
land in the west of the country. It is interesting that the variable indicating 
attendance at a Nonconformist service is in a sort of halfway house. The 
Nonconformist variable has a very large contribution (nearly half) to the third 
dimension. A conclusion is that attendance at a Nonconformist service was 
unrelated to any of the other variables. Wheat price in 1845 has a negative 
correlation because the transport costs involving in moving wheat were high.   
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5.3 Classification trees 
 The conditional classification tree seems almost too simple to work, yet it 
does. The classification tree has been used in a wide range of disciplines, from 
ecology43 to marketing. The procedure is non-parametric and algorithmic, and 
operates by testing whether the dependent variable and any one of the independent 
variables included as a possible predictor contributes any ‘information’ about the 
dependent variable. 44 The null hypothesis is that the independent variable contains 
no information about the dependent variable. If the null cannot be rejected, then 
that independent variable is selected as a possible node. Those nodes which do 
contain information about the dependent variable are then ranked, and the node 
which provides the most information is placed at the top of the tree. The 
algorithmic process continues until the supply of independent variables which 
contain information is exhausted. By the end of the process, the relationship 
between the dependent variables and the set of statistically significant independent 
variables has been drawn, and a set of terminal nodes constructed. The terminal 
nodes contain the results of the classification. In the case being examined in this 
article, we are able to count how many MPs voted for or against repeal and 
examine the influences on them. The results are presented below in figure 2, with 
voting on repeal as the dependent variable.  
Figure 2 here 
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Caption: Classification tree of voting over repeal.  
The classification tree analysis was performed with the variables detailed above, 
with Maynooth voting added. They are repeated here for clarity: 
Area under wheat and cattle 
Party affiliation (code 0 = Conservative; 1 = Whig/Liberal 
Wheat dependency: amount of wheat imported or exported from the constituency 
Maynooth voting record (0 = against providing grant; 1 = for) 
Capital intensity 
The dependent variable is coded as 1 means voted against Repeal (therefore 
Protectionist); 2 voted for Repeal (therefore Free Trade); 3 (absent).  
 
5.4 Classification Tree Results 
 
The classification tree has eliminated several of the independent variables, 
retaining only those with statistical significance. Those which were present in the 
PCA but which have been eliminated by the classification tree are: wheat price in 
1845; capital intensity; and wheat balance. These three variables did not have a 
statistically significant impact on voting over Repeal.  
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The independent variables that remain are ranked by amount of information 
contained. The first node, that is the node with the greatest amount of information, 
is party membership (0 means Conservative, 1 means Whig).  This is hardly a 
surprising result, because the Whig party under Lord John Russell had committed 
itself to reform of the Corn Laws at the end of 1845. For the Whigs, the next 
important split is at node 11, which is ‘constituency type’. County or rural seats are 
indicated by 0, small and large boroughs by 1 and 2 respectively. Whig votes are 
classified in terminal nodes 12 and 13, at the bottom right of the figure. The 
numbers below each terminal node refer to possible voting decisions, with a vote 
against repeal coded as 1, for repeal as 2, and absence as 3. Some ten Whig MPs 
did vote against repeal, and these ten represented deeply rural constituencies. The 
grey column within the terminal node (above the figure 2) indicates the proportion 
voting for Repeal. The proportion in the small and large boroughs (Type = 2 or 3) 
is higher than in the rural areas. Whigs who represented urban areas felt under 
more pressure to vote for Repeal than Whigs representing rural areas.  
 More relevant to this article are the results for Conservative MPs. For 
Conservatives, following the line marked 0 leading to the left of the figure, the 
variable with the most information is voting history over the increased grant to the 
Irish Catholic Seminary at Maynooth. The voting history is coded as follows: 0 
means that the MP voted against the Maynooth grant, 1 means for the grant. 
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Following those who voted against Maynooth, we come to node 3, which refers to 
percentage in the constituency attending an Anglican church on Census Day 1851. 
The best split occurs at the 15.21 per cent level. When the constituency’s 
percentage exceeds 15.21 per cent, the number of MPs voting against repeal is 
large. The meaning is twofold: constituencies with a larger share of the population 
attending Anglican services are more likely to be represented by an MP who voted 
against Maynooth, and who is therefore highly likely to vote against Repeal.  
 For those Conservative MPs who voted for Maynooth, there is an interesting 
series of subsplits: the type of their constituency mattered. If it was rural (Constype 
=1), then wheat acreage mattered. Those with a higher wheat acreage (>20.2) were 
more likely to vote against Repeal than those with a smaller wheat acreage. 
However, if the MP represented a small or large borough or university (Constype, 
2,3,4) then he was almost equally likely to vote for or against Repeal.  
 
6. Discussion 
 
The results reported above suggest that both Conservative and Whig MPs followed 
the preferences of their constituents when deciding how to vote over Repeal. Those 
most likely to vote against Repeal are classified into terminal nodes 5 and 10. For 
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terminal node 5, these are constituencies where the anti-Catholic feeling was 
especially strong. Node 10 is the most straightforward: rural areas with a large 
wheat acreage.  
 The accuracy of the model when Maynooth is included as a predictor 
variable is approximately 80 per cent correct classification (comparing predicted 
with observed). Without Maynooth, the accuracy reduces to about 60 per cent. An 
MP’s previous voting decision over Maynooth is therefore an important factor in 
his subsequent voting over Repeal. Maynooth occurred almost exactly a year 
before Repeal, and this result therefore matches Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey’s 
finding that Conservative MPs switched from being representatives to being 
delegates. The disruption to Peel’s authority over his Party caused by Maynooth 
meant that Conservative MPs felt free to vote as they felt that their constituencies 
would wish.  Above, we questioned why Peel failed to heed the warning signs 
from his backbenchers. The rebellion over Maynooth should surely have alerted 
him to the difficulties he would face over Repeal. Yet he pressed on with, as Eric 
Evans puts it, ‘purblind self-belief and contempt for the arguments of his 
opponents’ 45 77).  
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